Zammad GmbH · Zammad · Zammad GmbH Zammad Improper Privilege Management Vulnerability
Verdict
Patch first · actively exploited, reachable from the internet without credentials, and in the top 5% of CVEs by near-term exploitation probability
Added to CISA KEV 2026-10-02 · exploited in the wild for 36 days
How a test catches it
CVSS 9.4 CRITICAL. The score is a summary; these three components are the part that decides whether something scanning the internet can use it.
| Attack vector | networkreachable over the network, with no local access needed |
|---|---|
| Privileges required | noneneeds no credentials at all |
| User interaction | passiveneeds a user to click, load or submit something first |
| Base vector | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:C/RE:X/U:X |
| Weakness | CWE-269 |
This describes the vulnerability. It says nothing about whether your systems run it.
EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.1094, which places it in the top 5% of all tracked CVEs. The percentile is the more useful half: 0.18 in absolute terms sounds low until you know most of the internet-facing software in the world scores under that.
| EPSS probability | 0.1094 |
|---|---|
| Percentile | 0.959 — top 5% |
| Added to KEV | 2026-10-02 |
|---|---|
| Days exploited | 36 |
| Federal remediation due | not set |
| Ransomware use | no known ransomware campaign use |
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
Zammad packages built with packager.io (DEB and RPM) could have allowed a local attacker who already had file system write privileges as the unprivileged zammad service account to escalate to full root privileges on the host. Service processes began running as root and executed files that were owned and writable by the zammad account before dropping their identity to that account. An attacker holding that foothold could have escalated within seconds, because the affected services were restarted automatically whenever they stopped; no administrator interaction was required. Only installations from the DEB and RPM packages were affected — installations from source or the official container images were not. All released packaged versions were affected.
Web application penetration testing · API security testing · every service